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Introduction
The United States Supreme Court’s controversial ruling in the eminent domain case of Kelo v.
City of New London, Connecticut,1 ignited nationwide discourses on eminent domain. In a close
5-4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the government authority to condemn private
property and transfer it to other private parties to promote “economic development.”2 The
court’s affirmative decision in allowing the City to strip the petitioner, Susette Kelo, of her
home of decades for the development of a Pfizer plant stirred overwhelming widespread
outrage and prompted federal and state legislative reactions.3 The startling yet sobering public
outcry revealed the nub of the problem, as Professor Thomas W. Merrill testified to the Senate
that “the American people believe that property rights are invested with moral significance.”4
The right to private property is a central part of the American constitutional tradition.
However, when people’s constitutional property rights conflict with government authorities’
and interests, the Court is restrained, if not reluctant, to enforce them.5 Kelo v. City of New
London illustrates one dimension of such a legal controversy, whether “economic
development” is a valid public use that satisfies the requirements of the Fifth Amendment
Taking Clause. While the Court in Kelo affirms such claim, I disagree with its position -- private
economic development cannot be the sole objective of eminent domain.
This paper explores the evolution of the economic development rationale in the context of
eminent domain power, its rationale and problems, and potential solutions. Part II explores the
origin and evolution of the Public Use clause in the Constitution and then focuses on two major
Supreme Court decisions that paved the road for the contemporary economic development
rationale for eminent domain. Part III examines the establishment of economic development
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
Somin, Ilya, The Grasping Hand: Kelo V. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain, p. 2-3.
3
Sandefur, Timothy. "The Backflash So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform."
Michigan State Law Review, vol. 2006, no. 3, Fall 2006, p. 711
4
The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005)
5
Somin, Ilya, The Grasping Hand: Kelo V. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain, p. 2.
1
2

SPICE | Philosophy Politics and Economics Undergraduate Journal | Volume 15 | Spring 2020

1

The Abuse of Eminent Domain Power
rationale, from the state court precedent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo. Then it
distinguishes Kelo from Supreme Court precedents and discusses the legislative backlash to
highlight Kelo’s misuse of eminent domain power. Part IV explicates the inherent problems of
using economic development to justify the private-to-private eminent domain. Finally, Part V
draws on examples from other jurisdictions combating the issue of expropriation to shed light
upon alternative solutions to the abuse of eminent domain power in the name of economic
development.

The “Public Use” Limits on Eminent Domain
As one of the most intrusive inherent government powers,6 eminent domain is the
government's authority to take a citizen’s private property for public use without the owner’s
consent. Realizing that the right to property ownership is indispensable in securing individual’s
liberty and freedom, the framers of the Constitution placed two fundamental yet loosely
defined restraints on the government’s exercise of eminent domain, that the government may
only take private property for public use, and must provide just compensation to the owner of
the said property.7 Of the two restraints, the public use requirement has arguably posed a more
significant challenge to the judicial system, because its elusive concept has dramatically
changed since conception.
Historically, the concept of public use was construed narrowly, requiring that the taken land be
for the use of only the general public, such as highways, bridges, and other public utilities.8
Many courts saw laws or acts which “took from A to give to B,” as shown in Kelo, as the
paradigmatic abuse of government power.9 However, beginning in the Progressive Era,
intellectual leaders started to reevaluate the role of government, taking more initiatives to
promote public welfare.10 The landmark case Nebbia v. New York reflects such an evolving
attitude, upholding that states are free to adopt whatever policy that they deem reasonable for
social welfare, establishing the “rational basis test.”11 Twenty years after Nebbia, as the Court
imposed the rational basis test on eminent domain issues in Berman v. Parker,12 the clear
boundaries of public use began to erode, and courts gradually understand it more broadly,
encompassing not only “for public use” but also “public purpose.” Two cases in the Supreme
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Court reflect the evolution of the public use constraint and paved the way for economic
development eminent domain: Berman v. Parker,13 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.14

From “Public Use” to “Public Benefit”
The 1930s brought an upsurge in urban projects, designed to eliminate slums and blight, aided
by legislative funding aid, such as the United States Housing Act of 1937.15 While some courts
initially struck down government’s attempts to use eminent domain power to carry out urban
renewal programs, the majority upheld such taking by adopting the “public purpose” approach
to the public use rule.

Berman v. Parker
This frenzy of slum clearing set the stage for a new era of public use jurisprudence in the
Supreme Court with its landmark decision in Berman v. Parker, in 1954. In this case, the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the District of Columbia’s authority to condemn private
property and transfer it to other private parties for the purpose of removing plight and slums
and revitalize inner-city neighborhoods.16 Adapting the rational basis test to the public use
context, Justice Douglas holds the deference that “the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation.”17 In Berman, the Congress had
determined public needs that a large area of the city has fallen into the slum state, posing a
pressing danger to the public health and safety.18 To remedy the problem, the Congress enacted
District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Act of 1945. It authorized the city’s redevelopment
agency to take the blighted properties and transfer them to a private developer, who would
then revitalize this area by constructing and managing new commercial and residential
complexes.19 The owner of a department store in that land sued, arguing that the property was
transferred by the government to a private party.20 Nonetheless, the Court deemed the
government approach to be reasonable in furtherance of a proper legislative purpose of
removing plight and rebuilding the city’s economy, thus constitutional.21
However, before asserting the rationality of the government action, the Court must establish
that the transfer of private property to another private party with a public purpose is within the
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boundary of “public use.” While Congress declared that redevelopment of slums and blighted
areas has public benefit,22 the word “use,” after all, is not synonymous with “purpose.” The
Court then broadened the term “use.” Referring to several nineteenth-century cases involving
railroads, where some courts allowed the government to take private properties and transfer
them to private railroads corporations because railroads were essentially public utilities, the
Berman Court thus upheld that “public use” and “public purpose” are equal.23 However, while
the previous courts limited eminent domain by requiring the government to manage the
railroads, instead of the private corporations, the Berman Court disregarded such requirements
and further showed deference to the legislative by leaving the determination of what acts
benefit the public to the legislature’s discretion.24

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court reinforced its decision in Berman by unanimously
upholding takings of property for public benefit against the argument that they are private
takings. The setting for Midkiff was Hawaii, when, in the mid-1960s 94% of the privately owned
land was owned by seventy-two citizens, while the governments owned 49%.25 The Court
endorsed the legislative’s claim that the unequal distribution of property is harmful to the local
land market, inflating land prices and injuring the social welfare and stability.26 The Hawaii
legislature responded to the skewed land market by passing the Land Reform Act of 1967, under
which the government agency could condemn the properties of large landowners and transfer
to existing lessees.27 Employing the rational basis test, the Court found that the government’s
eminent domain condemnation is rationally related to the state’s conceivable public purpose to
diminish land oligopoly, thus constitutional under Berman precedent.28

Establishment of Private Economic Development Rationale: The
Birth of Economic Development Doctrine in the States
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit
In the interim between Berman and Midkiff, the Supreme Court of Michigan issued one of the
most notorious public use decisions. In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,29 the
Id. at, 34
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rationale of government exercising its eminent domain for economic development took root.
Suffering from financial distress and high unemployment, the City of Detroit tried to displace
3438 residents and 1176 structures in the Poletown neighborhood, condemning the land to
make room for General Motors’ (GM) new manufacturing factories.30 Deferring to the
government’s view that GM plant’s expected economic revitalization would generate public
benefit during an economic recession, the Supreme Court of Michigan upheld that a public use
existed under the Michigan Constitution.31 However, because, in this case, eminent domain
exercised by the government will benefit specific and identifiable private interests, the court
purported to inspect with heightened scrutiny whether the public benefit is the predominant
interest over the “incidental” private gain.32 The court answered in affirmative that the
projected benefit was “clear and significant.”33 Hence, the doctrine of economic development
emerged: the government can legitimately take non-blighted properties if other economic
stimuli were at stake.34

The Aftermath and Reversal of Poletown
The Poletown decision sparked a new latitude of exploiting “public use” for economic
development. In the 1980s, with Poletown decision specifically in mind, local condemnations
with the asserted purpose of economic growth began to increase.35 Consequently, litigations
challenges to such eminent domain increased in tandem, where property owners charged that
even under the expanded definition of public use, some particular projects could not pass.36
In one of the earlier property-owner successes, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 372004, the
Michigan Supreme Court overruled Poletown, one of the most notorious cases in laws on
eminent domain.38 The case involved the condemnation of several homeowners’ property for
the construction of a 1,300-acre business and technology park.39 Despite the economic prospect
and relatively smaller costs for individual private property owners, compared to Poletown, the
court declared Poletown’s interpretation of the state taking clause to be unconstitutional.40
Recognizing that the county was motivated by the Poletown’s disregard for constitutional limits
of its eminent domain power, the court established that the vague public benefit that would
Id. at 465-470
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result from the economic development project could not satisfy the constitutional public use
requirement.41 All set the stage for Kelo.

The Supreme Court’s Approval of Economic Development
Kelo v. City of New London
Having lessened the constraint of Public Use limits on eminent domain power, the Supreme
Court, as predicted, further affirmed the state’s authority to condemn private property and
transfer it to private developers to revitalize the local economy in Kelo v. City of New London.42
Desperate for economic revival, the City of New London was Susette Kelo’s hometown, where
she purchased a pink Victorian dream house in the Fort Trumbell neighborhood ten years
before and had lived there ever since. To combat the city’s economically distressed status, the
local officials launched a series of attempts, including the creation of The New London
Development Corporation (NLDC), to oversee the revitalization project.43
In 1998, the city received the good news that Pfizer, an international pharmaceutical giant,
planned to construct a $300 million research facility on a New London site adjacent to Fort
Trumbell.44 Hoping the new plant would anchor the local economic redevelopment plan and
capitalize Pfizer’s potential new business, the city approved NLDC’s municipal development
plan (MDP) for the Fort Trumbell neighborhood and granted NLDC the power to acquire
property within the development area through eminent domain.45 Although the specifics of the
plan were never articulated, as the NLDC never precisely defined the respective purposes of
MDP’s seven parcels, city officials still argued that the redevelopment project would benefit the
public, thus constitutional.46 Faced with the opposition from Susette Kelo, along with several
other residents refusing to give up their homes, the NLDC initiated condemnation procedures
merely because their properties, in no blighted condition, resided within the development
area.47
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the development plan in a close 5-4
decision. The majority adhered to the principle regarding public use established in case laws
that public benefit falls within the interpretation of public use and took a deferential stance to
the legislature’s determination that MDP’s plan served sufficient public purpose of economic
rejuvenation.48 Asserting that the promotion of economic development is a traditional and long
accepted function of government, the majority rejected setting a bright-line rule that economic
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development does not constitute a valid public use.49 However, the majority did find two
conditions that would violate the public use requirement, that either the taking is to benefit
private interests, or under the pretext of public purpose, such as economic growth, but
conferring private interests.50
In dissent, Justice O’Connor took a drastically different stance than her earlier authorship of
the Court’s opinion in Midkiff, arguably the most deferential of all the Court’s public use
decisions.51 Acknowledging the history of the Court’s deferential attitude towards legislative
determination as to what government actions benefit the public, Justice O’Connor insisted that
some external judicial check is necessary for such decisions.52 Distinguishing from Berman or
Midkiff, Just O’Connor reasoned that, in Kelo, the condemnation itself did not directly benefit
the public, but incidental to the private taking.53 Furthermore, not only did Justice O’Connor,
along with other dissenting judges, strive to invalidate New London takings but would have
categorically forbidden all private-to-private condemnations for economic development.54 The
problem with economic development condemnations, she argued, is that private benefits and
public interests are mutually reinforcing.55 Therefore, it is extremely challenging to isolate an
intent to benefit the public from one that advances private interests,56 thus foreclosing the
possibility of any meaningful limits on the scope of eminent domain power.

Differences from Berman and Midkiff
In light of the Court’s prior holdings in Berman and Midkiff, both the majority and dissenting
opinions referenced to these landmark cases for interpreting the Public Use Clause in Kelo. The
Court’s majority gutted the constitutional significance of public use constraint, arguing that
there was no principled difference between economic development and other public purposes
that the Court had recognized before, such as slums and blight elimination in Berman and
elimination of land oligopoly in Midkiff.57 Consequently, there was no reason to treat Kelo
differently from the previous unanimously ruled cases.58 That conclusion, however, was
arbitrary and misguided. As the dissent explicated, the majority effectively “delete[d] the words
‘for public use’ from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”59 The private economic
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domain is distinguishable from how the Court had defined and interpreted public use in the
past, even under the broad terms in Berman and Midkiff.
The first distinction between economic development eminent domain and others with public
purpose is whether the source from which the public benefit flows is the condemnation itself.
Traditionally, private property taken by the government is put into public use or government
ownership, directly generating an immediate public benefit.60 Even in Berman and Midkiff, when
the Court broadened term public use to permit private-to-private ownership transfer, the
condemnation itself directly resulted in public benefits.61 In her dissenting opinion, Justice
O’Connor framed such a distinction with the term “affirmative harm.”62 In Berman, the slums
and blighted properties in Washington, D.C., had already inflicted affirmative harm on
society.63 The condemnation itself, regardless of further actions by government or private
parties, immediately rid the public safety hazard and promote public welfare.64 Similarly, the
oligopoly of land ownership had skewed the land market and inflated prices in Midkiff, resulting
in an extreme wealth gap and affirmative harm.65 Therefore, the very act of transferring the
condemned property from wealthy landowners to the lessees terminated the harmful precondemnation property use.66 Condemnations for economic development, however, do not
themselves benefit the public, which will accrue only after the private party has put the
property into use and capitalize on its business.67 In Kelo, Justice O’Connor observed that the
City of New London did not categorize Kelo’s home as the source of any social harm.68 Hence,
the taking will not achieve any public purpose but serve as a stepping stone to the realization of
anticipated public benefit, during which the private party is the primary beneficiary.69
The second distinction concerns the “trickle-down” benefits of condemnations for economic
development. While the Court had established in previous cases that a government’s pursuit of
public interests might benefit private parties, such as, in Midkiff, the lessees gained secure
property ownership in the city’s effort to eliminate land oligopoly, the realization of public
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benefit was dependent on government action instead of the subsequent private use.70 On the
contrary, in economic development eminent domain, the private party determines if and when
the public benefit will accrue.71 Justice O’Connor voiced her concern in Kelo dissent, describing
the public benefit accruing from private gains as a secondary, incidental, and mere positive
side-effect of the private profit,72 at the expense of individuals’ constitutional right to private
property.
The third distinction stems from the diminishing effects of the taking itself on the realization
of public use, meaning that there is no guarantee that anticipated economic development and
corresponding public benefits will ever materialize.73 Neglecting the volatile nature of
economic development, the Kelo appeal court focused only on its purposed purpose.74 In reality,
however, the prospect, let alone the actual achievement, could drastically deviate from the
proffered purpose, as the development projects often involve unpredictable financial markets
and uncertain competitive factors.75 The reversal of the Poletown attests to such uncertainty although GM projected its plant would provide over 6000 jobs, the plant, at the height of its
operation, only employed fewer than 3000 employees.76 Furthermore, when the city permits a
development project without any definitive plans of the condemned land, the uncertainty
increases. In Kelo, the development plan firstly never specified the use of parcel 4A, in which
several petitioners lived, besides a vague definition of “park support.”77 Secondly, at the time of
condemnation, the NLDC had not signed an agreement with the developer officially.78 Without
a specific plan or signed agreement to guarantee, or predict the least, potential public benefit,
the economic development rationale for eminent domain can hardly satisfy the public use
requirement in the Fifth Amendment.

The Kelo Backlash
While most Supreme Court decisions get little public attention, Kelo stood out as the exception,
generating more public attention than all but a handful of other Supreme Court rulings.79 The
negative, if not hostile, public reactions resulted in significant gains for property rights
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation on
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54, no.
1, 2005, p. 208
72
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, at 2675.
73
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the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54, no.
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74
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advocates and led to more new state legislation than any other Supreme Court decision ever
did.80 Forty-five states have enacted reforms laws in response to the Kelo decision expanding
the eminent domain power, seeking to change the preexisting status quo.81 While the political
backlash failed to provide the same level of protection for property owners as a judicial ban
would, it is crucial to recognize that many states have enacted strong post-Kelo reform laws,
which substantially strengthened protection for property rights than had existed before Kelo.82

The Public Reaction
The public reaction to Kelo decision was fierce and swift, with both state-level and national
polls indicating overwhelming public opposition.83 Such condemnation cut across gender,
racial, ethnic, and partisan lines. The U.S. House of Representatives immediately passed a
Condemnation and resolution denouncing Kelo.84 Many political elites and activists joined
forces, some of which testified against the Court’s decision in the United States Senate
Judiciary Committee hearing on the ruling.85 Public opinion, shown in two national surveys,
reflected the opposition running deep and broad.86 The near-consensus leads one to anticipate
that the state and federal legislation would soon follow suit to abolish, or at least limit,
economic development eminent domain.87

The State Response
Acknowledging that condemnations may entail great hardship, Justice Stevens, in his majority
opinion in Kelo, emphasized that states were free to impose more significant limitations on
eminent domain power.88 A total of forty-five states welcomed the invitation and enacted postKelo eminent domain reform laws.89 Despite the numbers, many of them are mostly symbolic
and ineffective, providing little or no protection for private property owners.90 On the other
hand, laws enacted by some states legislature did impose significant limits on eminent

Id.
Id.
82
Id.
83
Sandefur, Timothy. "The Backflash So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform."
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domain.91 For example, both Pennsylvania and Minnesota passed laws forbidding economic
development eminent domain and restricting the definition of blight.92 Notably, fourteen states
stood out by enacting reforms by popular referendum.93 As citizen-initiated referendum
initiatives have led to stronger laws protecting property rights, nine of those provide property
owners significant protection against economic-development eminent domain beyond the
existing laws.94 Analyzing the mixed results of state reforms, Timothy Sandefur observes the
two obstacles faced by property rights advocates: the political influence of powerful developers
and redevelopment proponents, and the lack of philosophical foundation and support in
opposition to Kelo decisions.

The Federal Response
Compared with the far more extensive state-level reforms, the federal efforts are notable for
their modest effects and minimalistic nature.95 On November 3, 2005, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed the Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005 (PRPA) by an
overwhelming margin of 376 to 38.96 As the most significant federal reform effort, PRPA failed
to pass the Senate, despite repeatedly getting through the House in 2012, 2014,97 and 2018.98
When the Senate Judiciary Committee rejected its passage in 2018, the committee argued that
PRPA’s heavy-handed approach to preventing economic development eminent domain
punishes faultless communities, while failing to protect individual property owners
adequately.99 Furthermore, in light of over 40 states’ active legislative responses to Kelo, the
committee purported that the Congress should not substitute its judgment for that of the
individual state, therefore opposing PRPA.100

The Problems of Economic Development Rationale
Blurring the boundaries between public use and private benefits, eminent domain for economic
development raises concerns about the abuse of government power to advance private interests
at the expense of individual rights and the public good. In addition to the potential misuse of
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local government's police power, the economic development rationale is riddled with other
problems that would compromise the institution of private property ownership.101
The first inherent problem stems from the fact that the concept of public use has so broadened
that it could not stand as a barrier against the capture of eminent domain power by private
interest groups.102 The “interest group capture” describes the phenomenon that individuals will
use the public policy process to gain benefits from the government at a lower cost than they
would receive under fair market competition.103 When the municipalities invoke eminent
domain power, land acquisition is usually less costly and more efficiently.104 Then the interest
groups will have little incentive to negotiate with the property owners as they would in fair
market situation.105 The economic development eminent domain, therefore, would have
damaging effects on the small private property owners in their negotiation with influential
developers.
The interest group capture phenomenon gives rise to the second problem that state and local
governments may have incentives to sell their eminent domain power to the extent that the
private interests trump public benefits as the primary objective.106 Especially when desperate
for an economic boost, the municipalities may utilize eminent domain power as a “recruiting
tool” or competitive advantage to attract large developers or tax- and job-generating
corporations by promising them site condemnation for their projects.107 The Poletown case
attests to the government’s willingness to abuse its condemnation power to meet the
developer’s demands.108 After GM offered to build a new facility in the city as long as they could
find a suitable site, the municipality allowed GM to conceive the project, select pick the site,
and even make other demands for tax reductions and infrastructure upgrades.109 Finally, the
city turned over the site to GM for $8 million, while the projected public cost was $200
million.110
One of the most troublesome aspects of eminent domain power is that the government
deprives on an asymmetrical basis, leaving a particular property owner to bear the large
personal cost for the sake of the community benefit.111 When economic development is the
driving force, and the accrued social benefit become indirect and uncertain, such asymmetry is
Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation
on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54,
no. 1, 2005, p. 212
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further amplified, unfairly burdening the low-income residents and low-tax business while
serving the development firms and large corporations.112 Such practice is inconsistent with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution and the institution of private ownership, which aims to
secure to every man whatever is his own.113
Under the theory of Kelo, as Justice O’Connor warned, nearly all property is at the risk of
condemnation.114 The permissibility of the economic development rationale diminishes the
security of private ownership. Furthermore, as the government retains the authority to
determine whether a different use will create more substantial public use than its current one,
no property, however valuable to its owner, is immune from the government's takings for a
higher purpose.115

Proposed Solutions to Eminent Domain Abuse Under Economic
Development
While many commentators have proposed that a categorical prohibition on the economic
development rationale for eminent domain is the best solution to prevent its abuse, an
arbitrary ban would also prevent many transactions in public interests and force developers to
seek other loopholes.116 As the dilemma between private property rights and economic
development is not exclusive to the US context, comparative analysis across different countries
may shed light on some potential solutions available to American society after Kelo.

Germany: Public Purpose and Proportionality Tests
Similar to the United States, in Germany, property rights and the government’s right to
expropriate are based in Article 14 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), and such expropriation,
stated in Section 3, shall only be permissible for the public good.117 What distinguishes
Germany from U.S. constitutional property scheme is that property, in Grundgesetz, entails
obligations, and, therefore, its use shall serve the public purpose.118 However, recognizing
various property interests as constitutionally protected rights, the Federal Constitution Court
in Germany takes complete discretion over the definition of property from the legislature.119
Id.
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115
Fuhrmeister, Ashley J. "In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving Public Use as a Limitation
on the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London." Drake Law Review, vol. 54,
no. 1, 2005, p. 223.
116
Caylor, Matthew P. "Eminent Domain and Economic Development: The Protection of Property Four
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The Basic Law states that taking must meet two broad public interest criteria: the principles of
public purpose and proportionality.120 Firstly, only serious public purposes are valid, and, if the
state transfers the expropriated property to a private party, the state must show that the
private party is committed to the public purpose, either by contracting or taking collaterals.121
Unlike the US, however, takings for purely financial reasons, such as increasing tax revenue, are
not constitutionally permitted in Germany.122 Furthermore, as the Basic Law requires every
expropriation to fall under a federal or state statute that authorizes takings for that purpose, no
state law has ever allowed expropriation for job creation, thus preventing the state government
from abusing its power.123
Secondly, the expropriation must adhere to the German Basic Law legal principle of
proportionality.124 An uncodified legal construct, the principle of proportionality, in the context
of eminent domain, requires that taking is the mildest possible, yet necessary, infringement on
a right, and that the government can only take as much property as the project needs.125
Furthermore, the proportionality test requires that the net public benefit generated in the
expropriation outweighs the owner’s private interest in the property.126

Japan: Land Readjustment as Alternative to Expropriation
As eminent domain brings constant tensions between private property rights and public
purpose, one tool could be particularly useful in the US context: land readjustment.127 It
consists of pooling all land parcels within a designated area, joint planning for servicing the
land, and redistributing the land parcels orderly for public improvements.128 Widely used in
many countries, land readjustment mainly addresses three challenges: a disorderly plot
pattern, insufficient public space, and lack of funding or ability to expropriate private land for
public use.129 Additionally, through the creation and sale of extra land parcels, land
readjustment can raise funds, thus allowing neighborhood upgrade to be self-financing.130
Arguably the leading example of land readjustment scheme in Asia, Japan has one of the most
participatory land readjustment processes in the world, used in over 50% of all new
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development areas.131 Projects in Japan have a wide range of executors, from individuals,
landowner associations, and housing and town corporations, to local governments and
government agencies.132 As land readjustment project usually requires a minimum number of
participating landowners’ approval, in Japan, the two-thirds of owners and leaseholders must
agree on the plan if initiated by the private sector.133
To develop a successful land readjustment, the government ought to establish the following
primary conditions. Firstly, the legislature must construct a legal framework and articulate at
the state level, specifying what options exist if the landowner resists providing the land parcel,
as well as the entities, purposes, and timeframes permissible to initiate land readjustment
projects.134 Secondly, the sharing of costs and benefits between the public body and landowners
should be transparent and specified throughout the development timeline, from initial pooling
to final redistribution.135 While the municipality and the landowners do not have to share costs
and benefits equally, the distribution should reflect their respective contributions.136

Conclusion
In the decision of Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court had stretched the concept of
public use far beyond its constitutionality, to encompass the economic development rationale.
Though the Court’s decisions in Berman and Midkiff expanded the scope of public use and
paved the way for Kelo, eminent domain for the purpose of economic development is distinctly
separate from these two precedents, regarding the sources of public benefit, its dependence on
private profits, and its uncertainty of economic prospect. All the differences point to the fact
that eminent domain, under the disguise of economic development, prominently benefits the
private parties, thus rendering the Public Use doctrine in the Constitution nugatory. The
striking public reaction against the Kelo decision further highlights the legislative resistance
against the misuse of eminent domain power. Besides its unconstitutionality, the economic
development rationale has various problems that also compromise the institution of private
ownership in American society. As the inherent conflict of interests between the private
property rights and the government’s eminent domain authority is not exclusive to the US
context, comparative analysis across various nations may provide valuable lessons. Germany
has approached the problem by allowing more judicial scrutiny in the process of expropriation
and imposing strict limitations on the beneficiaries. Japan, along with various countries in the
world, has adopted the land readjustment to avoid the complications in expropriation while
achieving needed public use for private land. The states in the United States would do well to
learn from the numerous strategies to protect private ownership while advancing urban
development.
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